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The first section of the paper gives a stylised account of the development of the UK income tax structure over the
past 200 years, and refers to recent changes in other OECD countries. The second section turns to the distribution of
income and summarises the evidence about the top of the income distribution that can be derived from the income
tax data. The main results relate to the UK, but comparisons are made with similar evidence for Canada, France, the
Netherlands, and the US. The third part of the paper considers the explanation of the observed changes in the distri-
bution and the impact of progressive income taxation. How far are changes in income shares a reflection of the
re-arrangement of income? How far are they associated with changes in the composition of top incomes? Conclu-
sions about distributional incidence have to be based on modelling the determination of the personal income distri-
bution, but such modelling is not typically treated in public finance textbooks. The fourth section of the paper consi-
ders how the analysis of distributional incidence can be developed, paying specific attention to the explanation of the
upper tail of the distribution.
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1. Introduction
Income taxation has a long history in the United Kingdom, which first introduced the tax
in 1799. It was repealed, briefly in 1802, and from 1816 to its reintroduction in 1842, since
when it has been in continuous operation. Even if, as in this paper, attention is concentrated
on the twentieth century, this still gives us a period of experience that is long by the stan-
dards of economics. What can we learn from this experience? Of course, the information ob-
tainable from income tax records is limited and I shall be referring particularly to the impact
of the income tax on that part of the population best covered by the statistics: the top income
groups. The paper focuses on the United Kingdom (UK), but I believe that the methods and
findings have wider applicability to countries where income taxation is of more recent ori-
gin. It raises issues about the future direction of tax policy that go beyond the concerns of
one small island off the western coast of Europe. The subject is indeed of considerable policy
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United States, a distinct move away from progressive income taxation. Tax reform has com-
monly meant cutting top rates of tax and the reduction of graduation in the rate schedule.
What are the distributional implications, particularly for top incomes?
The first section of the paper gives a stylised account of the development of the UK in-
come tax structure over the past 200 years, and refers to recent changes in other OECD coun-
tries. The second section turns to the distribution of income and summarises the evidence
about the top of the income distribution that can be derived from the income tax data. Taxes
not only have economic and social effects; they also provide valuable statistical information.
These data relate to the UK, but comparisons are made with similar evidence for Canada,
France, the Netherlands, and the US. The third part of the paper considers the explanation of
the observed changes in the distribution and the impact of progressive income taxation. How
far are changes in income shares a reflection of the re-arrangement of income? How far are
they associated with changes in the composition of top incomes? Conclusions about distribu-
tional incidence have to be based on modelling the determination of the personal income dis-
tribution, but such modelling is not typically treated in public finance textbooks. The fourth
section of the paper considers how the analysis of distributional incidence can be developed,
paying specific attention to the explanation of the upper tail of the distribution.
2. A Brief History of Personal Income Tax
The personal income tax in the UK dates back to that imposed by William Pitt in 1799.
As one history describes it, the income tax was «the tax that beat Napoleon» (Sabine, 1966).
Not that it was universally popular. One naval officer wrote of the proposal to place a tax on
incomes «It is a vile... piece of impertinence – is a true Briton to have no privacy?» (quoted
by Sabine, 1966, page 31). The tax was indeed discontinued on the signing of the peace of
Amiens, but then reintroduced the year after, to remain in effect until 1816 when it was abol-
ished. It was ordered that, on its abolition, all records held by the tax commissioners should
be destroyed. There was supposedly a big bonfire outside Parliament, but the civil service
had kept copies. It is not clear that they were useful 26 years later when the tax was intro-
duced again in 1842, but the episode demonstrated the power of a bureaucracy relative to
that of the legislature. It should also be noted that the tax had its supporters. The Government
proposal to continue the income tax in peacetime was defeated only by a majority of 37 (238
votes against 201).
The income tax was re-introduced in the UK in Peel’s Budget of 1842. At first, the high
exemption level ensured that only a small minority of the population paid income tax. As in-
comes rose, more people were brought into the tax net. The burden was moderated by the op-
eration of various systems of abatement, and reduced rates, but towards the end of the nine-
teenth century, there was increasing pressure for a graduated rate structure and for
differentiation between earned and unearned income. The latter was introduced in the 1907
in the form of lower rates charged on earned incomes below a certain level, later extended
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Pressure for graduated rates culminated in the Lloyd George Budget of 1909 that introduced
supertax, later called surtax, from which developed a stepped structure, with increasing mar-
ginal rates of tax.
Before the First World War, the exemption level for income tax was around twice the
average tax unit income, and taxpayers were a minority of the population. Stamp (1916, page
449) cites an official estimate for 1912-3 of 1.15 million taxpayers, or some 5% of all tax
units (tax unit numbers from Atkinson, 2002, Table A1). The income tax was however to be-
come a mass tax over the course of the twentieth century. By 1930 the exemption level was
around average tax unit income, and Barna (1945, page 254) gives a figure of 10 million for
the number of taxpayers, in 1937, or some 40% of the total tax units. After the Second World
War, the exemption level had fallen to under half average tax unit income, and the majority
of the population had become payers of income tax.
In the decades following the Second World War, the income tax threshold in the UK fell
further to around a quarter of average income for tax units. The rate structure was graduated, so
that, in 1973, for instance, the marginal rate for earned income went from 30% to 75% by steps
of first 10% and then 5%. There was an investment income surcharge of 15%. The income tax
was a mass graduated tax. In this form, income tax might have been thought to have reached
maturity. But the 1980s saw a further twist in the story, with a reduction of the top rate, first to
60% and then to 40%, and the abolition of the investment income surcharge. The changes in
the 1988 Budget, introducing a two-rate structure of 25% and 40%, were undoubtedly a major
step in the direction of making the system less progressive. The subsequent introduction of re-
duced rate bands has moderated the effect, but the system remains much less progressive at the
top. The income tax in the UK has come to resemble a flat(tish) tax.
2.1. Recent Developments in Other OECD Countries
Tax structures in other OECD countries have followed their own patterns, but a number
of countries have made the same reduction in progressive rates at the top in recent decades.
The OECD Jobs Study noted a decade ago that «there were large reductions in the schedule
rates of tax in... Germany, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States...
mainly targeted on the higher income groups» (OECD, 1994, page 241). Messere, summaris-
ing the experience of ten OECD countries, concluded that «there was a sharp decline in top
tax rates between 1985 and 1994, together with a reduction in the number of rates» (1998,
page 11). Just to give one index, the average number of tax brackets (for 4 of the countries)
fell from more than 10 to slightly over 4 (Messere, 1998, page 13). In some, but not all, coun-
tries, base widening and increases in tax thresholds accompanied the reductions in the top
rates, and these operated in the direction of increasing effective progression, but it remained
the case that the income tax had become less graduated at the top.
Tax reform in the United States has been widely documented. The Tax Reform Act of
1986 was described by Pechman as «the most significant piece of tax legislation enacted
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changes in rate structure were indeed dramatic, replacing the fourteen rates going from 11%
to 50% by a two-rate structure of 15% and 28% (with an intermediate 33% arising from the
phasing-out of the benefit from the personal exemptions and lower rate bands). This «col-
lapse of the rate structure» was seen by Musgrave as «a giant step towards the principle of a
flat rate tax» (1987, p 65). Even if these changes have been partially reversed, the current
(2003) schedule having six brackets and a top rate of 35%, the tax structure remains very dif-
ferent from that in the 1950s and 1960s. In Canada, the Government in 1988 simplified the
federal income tax structure in a similar way, replacing the ten-bracket schedule, from 6% to
34%, by three rates of 17%, 26% and 29%. In the case of Sweden, the Government an-
nounced in 1988 the introduction of a comprehensive tax reform. This plan, billed as the
«Tax Reform of the Century» (Agell, Englund and Södersten, 1996), involved a substantial
reduction in top marginal tax rates, from around 75% to around 50% (depending on local tax
rates). The changes described so far in this paragraph took place in the 1980s and early
1990s. More recently, moves in the same direction have been made in countries such as
France and Germany that had been more resistant to the pressures of tax competition.
3. Evolution of Top Incomes over the Twentieth Century
Has the retreat from a graduated rate structure had significant distributional conse-
quences? This brings us to the distribution of income, and particularly the distribution of top
incomes. As already noted, the income tax is a source not just of revenue but also of statis-
tics. Data from the administration of income taxation played an important role in the early
construction of national accounts. Recently however income tax data have tended to be ne-
glected. Indeed, they tend to be scorned. The index to Morgenstern’s book On the Accuracy
of Economic Observations (1963) contains the entry «income tax, as reason for lying», and
this summarizes well the general scepticism. Income tax data do indeed have many short-
comings. The data are affected by tax evasion and avoidance. Definitions of income and of
income unit follow those of the income tax legislation, which varies over time and across
countries. Capital income is recorded to differing degrees in different countries, and the
same applies to executive compensation in kind and stock options. Income tax data are not,
however, alone in giving an incomplete picture: household surveys suffer from differential
non-response and under-reporting of income. Moreover, the income tax data have the merits
of being available for a much longer period than other sources and, in many countries, of
providing annual estimates. The income tax data inform us about periods that other sources
cannot reach.
3.1. UK Distribution since 1908
From the supertax (and later the income tax) statistics, it is possible to make estimates of
the shares in total income accruing to the top income groups – those subject from 1908 to the
graduated taxes (supertax and surtax) – see Figure 1. They are indeed small groups – the top
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10% before the First World War. I refer to «people», but the data relate to tax units, combin-
ing the incomes of husbands and wives, up to 1989. The switch to independent taxation, and
hence individuals, in 1990 is indicated by the «Break» in the series in Figure 1.
The figure reveals an intriguing history of decline in the top shares up to the end of the
1970s, intriguing since it is far from a steady downward trend. The First World War saw a
significant fall in the share of the top 0.1%. There was some recovery immediately after the
War but the top 0.1% ended the interwar period having lost further percentage points, so that
their 1939 share of total income was around a half that in 1913. The impact of the Second
World War was similar to that of the First World War in that the shares in total income of top
income recipients fell: the share of the top 1% in before tax income was reduced from 16.6%
in 1938 to 11.2% in 1949. The inequality was still large: in 1944 the Duke of Wellington was
reported (Cannadine, 1990, page 630) to have a gross income of some 150 times the mean in-
come. Post-war, the shares of the top groups fell steadily from 1948 for the next ten years,
but there was then a plateau, followed by a further fall from 1965 to the late 1970s.
The story of the first three-quarters of the last century was therefore one of significant, if
intermittent, declines in top income shares. The overall thrust was firmly in the direction of
reduced inequality. But the last quarter century saw a dramatic reversal of direction. Top in-
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Breakcome shares began to rise steadily and sharply. The share of the top 0.1% in 2000 was 4.8%,
well above its 1945 value of 4.2%. Account has to be taken of the move to independent taxa-
tion of husbands and wives in 1990 (see Atkinson, 2004), but the share of the top 1% rose by
3 percentage points between 1978 and 1989 and by a further 3 percentage points between
1990 and 2000.
This refers to incomes before tax. The rise in inequality is before allowing for the effects
of the reductions in top tax rates. What happened to incomes after income tax? We cannot go
so far back in time in this case, but Figure 2 shows the distribution of net incomes from 1937.
The rise in after tax inequality is even more marked. Even subtracting 1 percentage point for
the break in 1990, the share of the top 1% has risen from 4.2% in 1978 to 9.4% in 2000. The
increase has continued after the election of the Blair Government in 1997, and if the trend
continues the share will soon reach that observed in 1937. Indeed, in the case of the top
0.1%, we have precisely returned to the situation pre-Second World War.
3.2. Shares within Shares
The behaviour of the share of the top 1% depends on what is happening both to the dis-
tribution between rich and poor and to the distribution among the rich. In order to focus on
the latter, we can look at the «shares within shares». If one takes the UK income distribution
in 1979 (a year of relatively low inequality), then according to the income tax data the share
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Top 0,1%of the top 10% in gross income was 25.3%: i.e. 2½ times their proportionate share. Within
the top 10%, the top 10% (i.e. the overall top 1%) had a share of 20.9% of the total income of
the decile group: i.e. twice their proportionate share. And the top 10% within the top 1% (the
overall top 0.1%) had a share of 22% of the total income of the percentile group. The similar-
ity of these numbers reflects the fact that the upper tail of the distribution has approximately
a Pareto form, and in this sense they are not surprising. Assuming that the cumulative distri-
bution F within the top group is such that (1-F) is proportional to y–, where y is income, then
the within-group share of the top 1% within the top 10%, denoted by S1/S10 is given by
(0.1)(1–1/). The relation can be written
 = 1 / [1 + Log10 [S1/S10]] [1]
The larger the Pareto exponent, , the smaller is the within-group share. This method of
estimating the Pareto coefficient from the relative shares was proposed by Macgregor
(1936), who noted that it made a bridge between Pareto and Lorenz. For this reason, to draw
a distinction from other methods of estimating the Pareto coefficient (such as from the cumu-
lative frequency distribution), I refer to it as the Pareto-Lorenz coefficient. The
Pareto-Lorenz coefficients for the UK are shown in Figure 3. This graph brings out the al-
most inverted V shape, with a sharp reversal after 1978. Over the period, the coefficient rose
from 1.5 in 1918 to over 3 in the late 1970s; it then fell back to a value around 1.8 in 2000 (a
small part of the rise is due to the switch to independent taxation).
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My research on top incomes in the UK was stimulated by the work of Thomas Piketty,
whose study for France (Piketty, 2001 and 2003) led me to examine the evidence of the UK;
and this in turn has led to a group of researchers working on this subject. Figure 4 shows the
Pareto-Lorenz curves for five OECD countries since the Second World War. It should be re-
marked that there are differences in the definitions of tax units and of control totals for in-
come (see Atkinson and Leigh, 2003), which may affect the comparability of both levels and
trends. The series for Canada, for example, relates to individuals, and this may have been af-
fected differently by the rise in the proportion of married women in paid employment.
Looking across the evidence in Figure 4 for the five countries (Canada, France, Nether-
lands, the US and the UK), we see two striking features of the period. The first is the similar-
ity in the trend towards reduced inequality (rise in the Pareto coefficient) for the first part of
the half-century. The Pareto exponents were already quite similar, but they converged fur-
ther. By 1973 the Pareto-Lorenz coefficients had reached to 2.4 in France, 2.6 in the Nether-
lands, UK and the US, and 2.7 in Canada. The second striking feature is the subsequent di-
vergence. In Canada, the UK and the US the Pareto exponents fell. The US and the UK
switched position, but by 2000 the values are essentially the same as in 1949. It is true that
the turning point came later in the UK and Canada (around 1978), but the overall time-path
in the three Anglo-Saxon countries is similar. In contrast, as pointed out by Piketty (2001),
France did not see a sharp upward movement in inequality. Compared with 1970, the French
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DivergencePareto-Lorenz coefficient in 1998 is higher. The same is true in the Netherlands, where the
Pareto-Lorenz coefficient rose noticeably. These Continental European countries were ap-
parently moving to the beat of a different drum.
4. Taxation and the Distribution of Top Incomes
How far has income taxation been responsible for this pattern of distributional change?
For some people it is self-evident that progressive income taxation was responsible for the
decline in top income shares over the first three-quarters of the last century, and that the sub-
sequent reversal was due to the tax cuts at the top of the scale.
4.1. Taxes and Top Shares in the UK
As apparent support for this view, Figure 5 shows the UK shares of the top income
groups (in gross income) plotted on the same chart as the top rate of tax on investment in-
come. The tax rate is a moving average over the preceding 25 years, so that it assumes that
the present income shares are influenced by cumulated past taxes. The fit is not perfect but
there is a very close correspondence.
At the same time, one should regard this empirical association sceptically. It stimulates
questions rather than provides a definitive answer. First, there is the question as to how far
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Top 0,5%the tax-associated change is to be found in the reported income shares but not in the underly-
ing distribution. Are the changes in taxes causing people to change the form in which income
is received? Secondly, there is the question of the incidence of taxation. Would not economic
theory predict that a rise in the tax would affect economic behaviour? Surely we cannot sim-
ply assume that the gross incomes are unchanged? The standard analysis of an income tax
shows a supply and a demand curve for labour. If the supply is reduced, then part of the tax is
shifted to the demand side via a rise in the gross wage. Should we not expect the inequality of
gross wages to rise when the tax rate is increased, and to fall when top taxes are cut? This
consideration points to the need for a model of the distribution of income in order to explore
tax incidence. The third question concerns the relation between the top tax rates and the tax
treatment of the rest of the population. The share of the top 1% in total income depends on
how taxes are affecting total income. The movement of the share is a function not just of the
top tax rates but also of the top tax rate relative to other rates. This consideration points to ex-
amination of the shares within shares: the Pareto-Lorenz coefficients. For this, we need a
model that explains the shape of the upper tail.
4.2. Taxes and the Re-Arrangement of Income
The rise in UK top marginal tax rates (on investment income) from 5% in 1907 to 50%
in 1919 and then to 97.5% in 1945 provided an incentive for taxpayers to re-arrange their tax
affairs in order to receive income in forms that avoided, or evaded, taxation. The decline in
observed income shares may be in part a reflection of increasing conversion of income into
forms that do not appear in the income tax statistics. As just noted, for the shares of top
groups to fall, this requires either that the incentive has increased relative to that for the aver-
age taxpayer, or that the top income groups have greater opportunity to re-arrange their in-
comes. It does indeed seem plausible to assume that there is indeed greater opportunity, both
because investment income constitutes a larger proportion and because of the selective na-
ture of remuneration packages.
The thesis that the decline in top shares reflected income re-arrangement was powerfully ar-
gued by Titmuss in his book Income Distribution and Social Change (1962). Investment in pub-
lic companies that paid low dividends but generated high capital growth allowed return to be
converted into capital gains that were either tax-free or taxed at a lower effective rate. Evidence
is naturally hard to obtain, and is largely circumstantial. Atkinson (2002a) examines the effect of
imputing to the top 1% their estimated share of retained earnings, allowing for the declining
share of personal holdings as the holding of pension funds and life assurance companies in-
creased over the post war period. The results show that the decline in the share of top 1% in total
income is reduced but is still to be observed. Re-arrangement is part, but not all, of the story.
More recently, top tax rates have been reduced. The top rate on investment income in the
UK was cut from 98% to 75% in 1979, from 75% to 60% in 1984, and from 60% to 40% in
1988. These cuts may have worked in the reverse direction. In the United States, a large in-
crease in the top shares was observed after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Feenberg and
Poterba note that «it might in part have been the result of high-income taxpayers responding
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example, through a decline in nontaxable employer-provided benefits or through a reduction
in tax evasion» (2000, page 267). Gordon and Slemrod argue that «the jump in the observed
income of the high-income individuals during the 1980s could in part reflect the effects of a
reduction in income shifting [between corporate and personal tax bases] and an increased use
of wage compensation in response to the drop in personal tax rates relative to corporate
rates» (2000, page 245). In their analysis of top income shares in the US, Piketty and Saez
(2003) note the surge that happened after 1986 (see Figure 4), but point out that the average
increase from 1885 to 1994 is not significantly higher than the increase from 1978 to 1984 or
from 1994 to 1998. Again, it appears that income re-arrangement may have played a role, but
cannot provide a full explanation.
4.3. Sources of Income
In order to explore the impact of taxation on the underlying distribution, we need first to
consider the composition of income. In particular the explanations are likely to be different
for earned and unearned income. In examining this aspect, a simple decomposition may be
helpful. Taking for illustration the share of the top 1%, this can be broken down as follows:
Share of top 1% = Proportion of earned income C Share of top 1% of earners C
C Alignment coefficient for earnings + Proportion of investment income C
C Share of top 1% with investment income C Alignment coefficient for investment income [2]
The «alignment coefficient» for earnings is the share in earnings of the top 1% of income
recipients divided by the share of top 1% of earners. Since the top 1% of earners are not neces-
sarily in the top 1% of income recipients, the coefficient is by definition less than or equal to 1.
The decomposition brings out the relation with the composition of incomes: the shares
of earned and unearned income in total gross income. These shares are related to, but not
identical to, factor shares in GNP. They are not the same, because the figures relate to house-
holds. Between households and the total economy stand various institutions, including the
company sector, pension funds, and the government. Reference has just been made to the
re-allocation of income between persons and corporations. We have seen the growth of pen-
sion funds. These funds own shares in companies and hence receive dividend income. This
dividend income is then paid to pensioners, in whose hands it is treated as deferred earnings,
so that – in these statistics – it does not appear as unearned income.
The share of the top 1% depends on its share in total earnings and total investment income.
This depends in turn on the distribution of these sources. For example, we can take just earned
income, and look at the share of the top 1% of earners. This is the first italicised term in equa-
tion (2). But the top 1% of earners are not necessarily the same people as the top 1% of income
recipients. This is where the alignment coefficient enters the picture. There may be zero align-
ment in that all the top 1% of income recipients live off investment income: they have zero
Income Tax and Top Incomes over the Twentieth Century 133earnings and hence a zero share. Or it may be that earned and unearned incomes are perfectly
correlated: so that the members of the top 1% are the same people in all three distributions.
In the theoretical analysis of the next section, I focus on the shares in earnings and the
shares in investment income (the terms in italics in equation [2]). Figure 6 shows for the UK
the share of the top 1% of individual earners and the top 1% of wealth-holders, wealth being
taken as an indicator of investment income. It should be noted that there are breaks in both
series due to differences over time in the sources (see the Note on Sources of Figures). In the
case of the earnings series, there is an overlap, which demonstrates that the movements over
time were similar for that period. Account should also be taken of the fact that the series refer
to individuals, whereas the income series in Figures 1 to 4 refer until 1990 to tax units, com-
bining the incomes of husbands and wives. The changes in the income series in part reflect
the increased importance over the twentieth century of the earnings of married women.
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Top 1% of earners
Scale
Top 1% wealth-holders
ScaleThe share of top 1% of individual earners in Figure 6 exhibits the same post-war pattern
as the overall distribution, with a steady reduction in inequality from the mid-1950s to the
late 1970s, and then a definite reversal. By 2001 the share of the top 1% of earners is above
that for 1954, particularly when allowing for the break in the series. The time path of the
share of top wealth-holders in total wealth is rather different, exhibiting a long-run decline
from 1923 that continued until around 1990. The share then began to increase.
In focusing on the shares of earned income and of capital income, I am leaving out some
potentially important elements. From equation [2] we can see that taxes potentially affect all
elements in the decomposition. There has for example been a shift in the overall composition
of income. It should be observed that the scales of the two vertical axes in Figure 6 are differ-
ent: the scale for the share of the top 1% of earners runs from 0 to 7%; the scale for the top
1% of capital runs from 0 to 70%. Wealth, and investment income, is much more unequally
distributed than earnings. Ceteris paribus, a shift away from investment income to earned in-
come will reduce the top income shares. Together with the changes in the distributions of
earnings and capital, this is causing the alignment coefficients to change. In the US, accord-
ing to Piketty and Saez, «the coupon-clipping rentiers have been overtaken by the working
rich», whereas «in France, in contrast top incomes are still composed primarily of dividend
income (2003, page 37). To the extent that personal income composition reflects the factor
distribution, then we can draw on the classical theory of tax incidence to examine the role
that taxation may have played in the observed shift in income composition (see for example
Atkinson, 1994).
5. Modelling Tax Incidence at the Top of the Distribution
As Musgrave brought out in his classic The Theory of Public Finance, «while textbooks
continue to refer to the theory of factor pricing as the theory of distribution, the significance
of the classical approach has been reduced in various ways» (1959, page 223). Musgrave
notes that we need to study incidence in terms of size brackets of personal income, and
shows a hypothetical Lorenz curve. He does not however go on to consider models of the
size distribution. He cites Dalton’s Principles of Public Finance (1939) but not his book on
Some Aspects of The Inequality of Incomes in Modern Communities (1920), which can be
read with profit today for its analysis of the personal distribution. In this section, I consider a
selection of formal models of the upper part of the personal distribution that allow us to ex-
amine the incidence of taxation.
5.1. Capital Accumulation
The first model is based on savings accumulation. Meade (1964) developed a theory of
individual wealth holding, allowing for accumulation and transmission of wealth via inheri-
tance, and this model has been analysed in a general equilibrium setting by Stiglitz (1969).
With equal division of estates at death, a linear savings process, and persistent differences in
earnings, in the long-run the distribution of wealth mirrors the distribution of earnings
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ever generate long-run equilibria where there is inequality of wealth even where earnings are
equal. Stiglitz shows how the operation of primogeniture in passing on wealth can lead to a
stable distribution with a Pareto upper tail, with
 = loge [1 + n] / loge [1 + sr(1–t)] [3]
where sr(1–t) is the rate of accumulation out of wealth, r being the rate of return and t the tax
rate, and n is the rate of population growth (Atkinson and Harrison, 1978, page 213). For sta-
bility, the population growth rate has to exceed the rate of accumulation by the wealthy, so it
follows that  is greater than 1. The faster the rate of accumulation, the closer  is to 1.
The model is highly stylised but provides a starting point for analysing the decline and
then rise of the top shares over the post war period. The impact of taxation in this model is
via past accumulation, and we have therefore a possible explanation for Figure 5, which re-
lated the lagged average of tax rates to the share of the top 1%. The behaviour of the gross
shares reflected the impact of past taxes in reducing accumulation: the rich at time t have
smaller shares because taxes reduced their capacity to save in years prior to t. On the other
hand, we have not yet addressed the incidence question: we need to allow for the effect of
taxation on the rate of return via the impact on total capital accumulation. The Stiglitz model,
by assuming that savings are proportional to income, assumes away any feedback from the
changing distribution of wealth to the rate of return, but once we introduce graduated rates of
taxation, we lose the linearity. Even with only two rates of taxation, we need to allow for the
changing amount of income above the kink in the tax schedule. One aspect of progression
can however be introduced if we allow for the tax rate, ti, on investment income to be higher
than that, te, on earned income. This generates a model with differential savings propensities
out of gross investment and earned income, as in the Kaldor (1961) model, although with the
propensities reversed. If  denotes (1–ti)/(1–te), the net of tax income from investment rela-
tive to that from earnings, and  denotes share of wages relative to profits in national income,
then in steady state the gross rate of return is given by
rs(1 – te)[  + ]=rs(1 – ti)[ / +1 ]=n [4]
An increase in the tax on investment income reduces  and hence raises the steady state
rate of return. To some degree therefore the effect of the tax is shifted. It may be seen, how-
ever, from the second form of the expression that the net of tax return is reduced, so that the
shifting is less than complete. Qualitatively, the earlier conclusion regarding the distribu-
tional implications remains valid. The analysis clearly needs however to be extended to a
graduated rate structure, which is a more complex exercise.
5.2. Models of Top Earnings
In considering possible explanations in terms of earned incomes, the empirical represen-
tation in terms of the Pareto exponent again provides a direct link to theoretical models. One
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ing with executive remuneration in a hierarchical structure. The model advanced by Simon
(1957) and Lydall (1959 and 1968, page 129) generates an approximately Pareto tail to the
earnings distribution, with a Pareto exponent given by
 = loge[span of managerial control] / loge[1+ increment with promotion] [5]
More recent theories, such as tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), have pro-
vided an explanation of the size of the necessary increment. If one considers the position of
people at particular level in an organisation, deciding whether or not to be a candidate for
promotion to the next rank, then they are comparing the certainty of their present position
with the risk of taking a new position in which they may fail, and lose their job. The higher
rank job also involves greater effort. In the very simplest case, they weigh the mean gain
against the variance, as a measure of risk. With a linear trade-off between mean and vari-
ance, which is equivalent to a quadratic utility function, the required gross of tax increment
to make the person indifferent is a function of the tax rate that contains a mean term which
increases with the tax rate and a variance term that decreases with the tax rate. There are two
competing effects. On the one hand, the tax reduces the financial gain from promotion and
more is needed to compensate for the increased effort. On the other hand, the tax reduces the
risk of the new job: the government shares part of the risk. We can see then a further possible
reason why the gross inequality may vary positively with (1–t).
A second explanation of the rise in inequality in the second half of the post-war period is
provided by the «superstar» theory of Rosen (1981). The expansion of scale associated with
globalisation and with increased communication opportunities has raised the rents of those
with the very highest abilities. As in the title of the book by Frank and Cook (1995), it is a
Winner-Take-All Society. Where the «reach» of the top performer is extended by technical
changes such as those in Information and Communications Technologies (ICT), and by the
removal of trade barriers, then the earnings gradient becomes steeper. Moreover, Frank and
Cook (1995) argue that the winner-take-all payoff structure has spread beyond fields like
sport and entertainment: «it is fair to say that virtually all top-decile earners in the United
States are participants in labor markets in which rewards depend heavily on relative perfor-
mance» (Frank, 2000, page 497). This could explain the fall in the Pareto coefficient in the
past quarter century. Indeed Rosen made precisely this prediction in 1981, referring back to
Marshall’s Principles, where Marshall identifies «the development of new facilities for com-
munication, by which men, who have once attained a commanding position, are enabled to
apply their constructive or speculative genius to undertakings vaster, and extending over a
wider area, than ever before» (1920, page 685).
What is then the effect of taxation? Frank (2000) has argued that the effect of progres-
sive income taxation is to reduce the number of people entering occupations where the most
talented collects the whole rewards. Talent is not known ex ante, and the anticipated rewards
for the winner, V(N), increase (at a diminishing rate) with the number entering, N. If entrants
compare the expected gain, V(N)/N, with the wage in an alternative occupation, then a gradu-
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hence the size of the final rewards. This is a third example of a situation in which the shares
of the top groups in gross income is a decreasing function of the tax rate.
The superstar theory needs to be extended to take account of the inter-relation between
the distributions in different countries. We do not have parallel universes. The changes in the
US affect what happens in other countries, and vice versa. We can in fact contrast the two
earnings theories considered here. On the managerial pay story, we might expect competi-
tion to drive up managerial pay insofar as they share a common market. The cuts in taxation
in the US will in this case spill over to other countries causing their top shares to rise. But on
the superstar theory the relation may be negative. We may start with separate superstars but
as the market opens up, then US superstars have global reach and they may scoop the whole
of the pool. In this way the top shares in the different countries may be negatively inter-de-
pendent.
6. Summary
The history of income taxation in the United Kingdom over the past two centuries has
seen its evolution from an elite tax, charged at a low rate, to a graduated and differentiated
tax, becoming in the twentieth century a mass progressive tax, with a stepped schedule of
marginal rates and higher taxes on investment income. The last two decades, however, have
seen a retreat from graduation and the abolition of differentiation.
From the UK income tax data, one can estimate the shares of top income recipients in to-
tal gross income for almost the whole of the twentieth century. Data from income tax records
suffer from a number of evident shortcomings, but they have the merits of being available for
a much longer period than other sources and of providing annual estimates. The estimates
show a substantial, if intermittent, decline in UK top income shares up to the end of the
1970s, followed by a dramatic reversal, with the share of the top group in 2000 being above
its 1945 value. The rise in after tax inequality is even more marked.
Evidence on top income shares for five countries (Canada, France, Netherlands, the US
and the UK) over the post-1945 period exhibits two striking features. The first is the similar-
ity in the trend towards reduced inequality for the first part of the half-century; the second is
the subsequent divergence. In Canada, the UK and the US, top income shares have risen; in
France and the Netherlands there is no apparent increase in recent decades.
At first glance, it appears that progressive income taxation was responsible for the de-
cline in UK top income shares over the first three-quarters of the last century, and that the
subsequent reversal was due to the tax cuts at the top of the scale. Tax policy can explain
both the U-shaped pattern of top income shares over time and the differences between the
Anglo-Saxon countries and Continental Europe. We need however to consider how far the
observed pattern may reflect the re-arrangement of income, rather than genuine distribu-
tional change, and the incidence of income taxation. Evidence is naturally hard to obtain, but
it appears that income re-arrangement may have played a role, but cannot provide a full ex-
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component parts suggests that we look at the concentration of wage and capital incomes, as
well as the share of earnings and investment in total income. The observed fall and rise in top
income shares may have been influenced by taxation via several different routes.
In order to explore further the distributional incidence of income taxation, we need to
model the top of the income distribution, a subject that is rarely treated in public finance text-
books. Examination of three different models, one of capital accumulation and two of top
earnings, indicates three different mechanisms by which higher top tax rates may have re-
duced the top shares in gross income. If that is the case, the retreat post 1979 from graduated
and differentiated income taxation may in part be responsible for the rise in gross income in-
equality and, a fortiori, for the even sharper rise in the shares in net income.
References
Agell, J., P. Englund and J. Södersten (1996), “Tax Reform of the Century - The Swedish Experiment”,
National Tax Journal, 49: 643-664.
Atkinson, A. B. (1994): “The Distribution of the Tax Burden” in J. M. Quigley and E. Smolensky (edi-
tors), Modern Public Finance, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Atkinson, A. B. (2002), “Top Incomes in the United Kingdom over the Twentieth Century”, Discus-
sion Paper in Economic and Social History, no. 43, University of Oxford.
Atkinson, A. B. (2002a), “Data Matter”, Auckland: Alfred Cowles Lecture presented at the
Australasian Meetings of the Econometric Society, July 2001.
Atkinson, A. B. (2004), “Top Incomes in the UK over the Twentieth Century”, revised version of
Atkinson (2002).
Atkinson, A. B., J. P. F. Gordon and A. J. Harrison (1989), “Trends in the Shares of Top
Wealth-Holders in Britain, 1923-81”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 51: 315-332.
Atkinson, A. B. and A. J. Harrison (1978), Distribution of Personal Wealth in Britain, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Atkinson, A. B. and A. Leigh (2003), “The Distribution of Top Incomes in Anglo-Saxon Countries
over the Twentieth Century”, discussion paper.
Atkinson, A. B. and W. Salverda (2003), “Top Incomes in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
over the Twentieth Century”, discussion paper.
Atkinson, A. B. and S. Voitchovsky (2003), “The Distribution of Top Earnings in the UK since the
Second World War”, discussion paper.
Barna, T. (1945), Redistribution of Incomes Through Public Finance in 1937, Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Cannadine, D. (1990), The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy, New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Dalton, H. (1920), Some Aspects of The Inequality of Incomes in Modern Communities, London:
Routledge.
Income Tax and Top Incomes over the Twentieth Century 139Dalton, H. (1939), Principles of Public Finance, ninth edition, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Feenberg, D. R. and J. M. Poterba (2000), “The Income and Tax Share of Very High-Income House-
holds, 1960-1995”, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 90: 264-270.
Frank, R. H. (2000), “Progressive Taxation and the Incentive Problem”, in J. B. Slemrod, editor, Does
Atlas Shrug?, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Frank, R. H. and P. J. Cook (1995), The Winner-Take-All Society, New York: Free Press.
Gordon, R. H. and J. Slemrod (2000), “Are ‘Real’ Responses to Taxes Simply Income Shifting Be-
tween Corporate and Personal Tax Bases?”, in J. B. Slemrod, editor, Does Atlas Shrug?, New York:
Russell Sage Foundation.
Kaldor, N. (1961), “Capital Accumulation and Economic Growth” in F. A. Lutz, editor, The Theory of
Capital, London: Macmillan.
Lazear, E. P. and S. Rosen (1981), “Rank-order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts”, Journal
of Political Economy, 89: 841-864.
Lydall, H. F. (1959), “The Distribution of Employment Incomes”, Econometrica, 27: 110-115.
Lydall, H. F. (1968), The Structure of Earnings, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Macgregor, D. H. (1936), “Pareto’s Law”, Economic Journal, 46: 80-87.
Marshall, A. (1920), Principles of Economics, London: Eighth edition, Macmillan.
Meade, J. E. (1964), Efficiency, Equality and the Ownership of Property, London: Allen and Unwin.
Messere, K. (1998), The Tax System in Industrialized Countries, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Morgenstern, O. (1963), On the Accuracy of Economic Observations, second edition, Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Musgrave, R. A. (1959), The Theory of Public Finance, New York: McGraw-Hill.
Musgrave, R. A. (1987), “Short of Euphoria”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1: 59-71.
OECD (1994), The Jobs Study, Paris: OECD.
Pechman, J. A. (1987), “Tax Reform: Theory and Practice”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1: 11-28.
Piketty, T. (2001), Les hauts revenus en France au 20ème siècle, Paris: Grasset.
Piketty, T. (2003), “Income Inequality in France, 1901-1998 ”, Journal of Political Economy.
Piketty, T. and E. Sáez (2003), “Income Inequality in the United States”, Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 118: 1-39.
Rosen, S. (1981), «The Economics of Superstars», American Economic Review, 71: 845-858.
Sabine, B. E. V. (1966), A History of Income Tax, London: Allen and Unwin.
Sáez, E. and M. Veall (2002), “The Evolution of High Incomes in Canada, 1920-2000”, mimeo.
Simon, H. (1957), “The Compensation of Executives”, Sociometry, 20: 32-35.
Stamp, J. C. (1916), British Incomes and Property, London: P. S. King.
Stiglitz, J. E. (1969), “Distribution of income and wealth among individuals”, Econometrica, 37:
382-397.
Titmuss, R. M. (1962), Income Distribution and Social Change, London: Allen and Unwin.
140 A. B. ATKINSONResumen
En el primer epígrafe de este trabajo se ofrece una visión reelaborada de la evolución de la estructura del IRPF britá-
nico en los últimos 200 años y se analizan los cambios recientes experimentados por el impuesto en los restantes paí-
ses de la OCDE. El segundo epígrafe analiza la distribución de la renta y resume las conclusiones que se pueden ex-
traer de los datos sobre el IRPF relativas al extremo superior de la distribución de la renta. Los principales resultados
se refieren al Reino Unido, pero se ha realizado también una comparación con Canadá, Francia, Holanda y Estados
Unidos obteniéndose una evidencia similar a la de nuestro país. El tercer epígrafe analiza los cambios observados en
la distribución de la renta y los efectos de la imposición progresiva sobre la renta en la misma. ¿Hasta qué punto las
variaciones de las distintas participaciones en la renta reflejan una reordenación de esta última? ¿Hasta qué punto se
asocian con variaciones en la composición de las rentas más elevadas? Las conclusiones sobre la incidencia distribu-
tiva deben basarse en un modelo de determinación de la distribución de la renta personal, pero en general tal modelo
no se estudia en los manuales de Hacienda Pública. La cuarta parte de este artículo trata de cómo desarrollar el análi-
sis de la incidencia distributiva, prestando especial atención a la especificación del extremo superior de la distribu-
ción.
Palabras clave: renta, imposición, distribución de la renta, incidencia impositiva.
Clasificación JEL: H2.
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